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SUSPECTED TERRORISTS: 
DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV AND THE 




This Comment examines the application of the public safety exception 
to Miranda to cases of domestic terrorism, looking particularly at the case of 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. By comparing 
the Department of Justice’s War on Terror policies to the Warren Court’s 
rationale for Miranda, this Comment argues that courts should require law 
enforcement officers to have reasonable knowledge of an immediate threat 
to public safety before they may properly invoke the Quarles public safety 
exception.  
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INTRODUCTION 
April 15, 2013. The finish line of the Boston Marathon, on the north 
side of Boylston Street, on a beautiful spring day.1 It is 2:49 in the 
afternoon. The race clock reads 4:09:43.2 Suddenly, a boom “like a cannon” 
erupts.3 Runners and spectators see a “ball of fire,” then smoke, glass, 
debris.4 Thirteen seconds later, a second explosion rips through the crowd 
five hundred feet away.5 There are people on the ground, limbs scattered, 
blood everywhere.6 Three spectators lie dead, and nearly two hundred sixty 
people are strewn, injured.7 Bombs made from two pressure cookers filled 
with nails and shrapnel.8 
April 18, 2013. The FBI is running a multiagency investigation into 
the bombing.9 It releases images and descriptions of two suspects, soon 
identified as Chechen-American brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev.10 In the pre-dawn hours of the next day, the same two men open 
fire on a campus police officer on the campus of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology in Cambridge.11 They carjack an SUV at gunpoint across the 
Charles River in Allston. A car chase and shootout with police in 
Watertown follow, during which Tamerlan is killed.12 Dzhokhar escapes in 
the stolen car.13 
 
1 Christine Fennessy et al., What We Saw and How We Responded: An Oral History of 








9 Press Release, FBI Boston, Remarks of Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers 
at Press Conference on Bombing Investigation (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.
gov/boston/press-releases/2013/remarks-of-special-agent-in-charge-richard-deslauriers-at-
press-conference-on-bombing-investigation-1, archived at http://perma.cc/L24S-8QT5. A 
wide variety of federal, state, and local agencies contributed to the investigation, including 
the Boston Police, ATF, Massachusetts State Police, and the more than thirty agencies of the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force. Id. 
10 Id.; Greg Botelho, Timeline: The Boston Marathon Bombing, Manhunt and 
Investigation, CNN (May 2, 2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/01/justice/
boston-marathon-timeline/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6W7-W789. 
11 Botelho, supra note 10. The officer dies of his wounds. Id. 
12 Id. 
13 The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/19/us/boston-marathon-manhunt.html?ref=bostonmarathon 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7SJ6-YJ89. 
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April 19, 2013. The entire Boston region is locked down for most of 
the day. Residents are told not to leave their houses, as law enforcement 
searches for the missing suspect.14 The lockdown is lifted at dusk. Shortly 
thereafter, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is found bloody and weakened in a dry-
docked boat in a Watertown backyard. After a brief standoff, he is taken 
into custody around 8 P.M.15 He is too injured to speak.16 With official 
sanction from the Obama Administration, special counterterrorism agents 
question, but do not Mirandize, Dzhokhar.17 Dzhokhar confesses to planting 
the bombs with his brother.18 He is questioned in his hospital room for 
sixteen hours over two days, before Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowles, 
and two representatives from the U.S. Attorneys’ Office show up to 
conduct a hearing. At this point, on April 22, 2013, Dzhokhar is finally read 
his rights.19 
Everyone with a television knows the famous words police officers 
must say before they can question someone in custody: You have the right 
to remain silent. If you give up that right, anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you 
can’t afford one, one will be appointed to you.20 Everyone knows these 
protections as “Miranda rights.”21 But the Boston bombing aftermath 
showed that, contrary to popular belief,22 these rights are not absolute. 
 
14 Eric Schmitt et al., Bombing Inquiry Turns to Motive and Russia Trip, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2013, at A1. 
15 The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects, supra note 13. 
16 Schmitt et al., supra note 14. 
17 Id. 
18 Rodrique Ngowi et al., Officials: Suspect Described Plot Before Miranda, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:50 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/lawmakers-ask-
who-knew-what-about-bomb-suspect, archived at http://perma.cc/QRM7-E7DK. 
19 Transcript of Initial Appearance Before the Honorable Marianne B. Bowler, United 
States Magistrate Judge, on April 22, 2013 at 4–5, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr-
10200 (D. Mass. Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Tsarnaev Initial Appearance]; see also Emily 
Bazelon, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Talked for 16 Hours Before He Was Read His Rights, SLATE 
(Apr. 25, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarnaev_s_interrogation_his_miranda_warning_shouldn_t_have_
taken.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XP8Q-CRSZ. 
20 Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Hothouse (NBC television broadcast Jan. 13, 
2009). 
21 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
22 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHAT TO DO IF YOU’RE STOPPED BY POLICE, 
IMMIGRATION AGENTS OR THE FBI, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
aclu_kyr.pdf (failing to mention any exceptions to the Miranda rule in its instructions on 
how to exercise one’s Miranda rights), archived at https://perma.cc/ZHQ9-3JED; 
“Miranda” Rights and the Fifth Amendment, FindLaw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-
rights/miranda-rights-and-the-fifth-amendment.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (same), 
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The Supreme Court has created a public safety exception to Miranda’s 
broad language. In New York v. Quarles, the Court held that in some 
situations presenting threats to public safety, the public’s interest in safety 
outweighs an individual’s right to be informed of her Fifth Amendment 
rights.23 In Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
defendants have the constitutional right to have these warnings read to 
prevent self-incrimination, but it left intact the rule’s numerous 
exceptions.24 
Where the right ends and the public safety exception begins remains 
elusive. Circuits are split as to how that exception should be interpreted and 
what factual scenarios should properly trigger the exception. Approaches to 
the public safety exception fall largely into two camps: the broad and the 
narrow approaches to Quarles. Circuits following the broad approach allow 
courts to admit evidence of prewarning statements made in inherently 
dangerous situations, regardless of the immediacy or severity of the threat 
to public safety. Those following the narrow approach admit such evidence 
at trial only when law enforcement officers have actual knowledge of an 
imminent threat to public safety. 
This Comment advocates for the use of the narrow approach to the 
public safety exception, even in terror contexts. By requiring officers to 
have actual knowledge of an immediate threat to the public, the narrow 
approach hews closely to the facts and reasoning of Quarles itself, and 
allows both Miranda and its exception to coexist without the exception 
consuming the rule. The Supreme Court should clarify that the Quarles 
public safety exception applies only in narrow circumstances before another 
person is potentially deprived of her constitutional rights. Our constitutional 
democracy depends on the rule of law—or a match between the law as 
written and the law as applied—for its legitimacy. Because Miranda is a 
constitutional right,25 exceptions to its rule must be minimized as much as 
possible, even if the rule has little effect on suspects’ behavior i I  n practice. 
Miranda is especially important as “a symbol of American commitment to 
due process”26 in the terror context. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the history of the 
Supreme Court’s confessions jurisprudence, exploring the reasons the 
 
archived at http://perma.cc/E4UQ-L92U. 
23 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
24 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
25 Id. 
26 Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the 
Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 763 
(2011). 
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Warren Court thought the rule necessary, and the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts’ gradual erosion of the rule. Part II examines the application 
of Miranda and Quarles to the War on Terror. It argues that the narrow 
approach to the public safety exception strikes an appropriate balance 
between the needs of law enforcement and the individual rights of terror 
suspects. Part III concludes by analyzing the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 
and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and showing how the narrow 
approach to the public safety exception can still yield socially desirable 
convictions. 
I. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONFESSION LAW 
A. THE ROAD TO MIRANDA 
In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”27 
Between the 1880s and the 1960s, courts held this to mean that a confession 
was admissible only if it was “voluntary” and comported with due 
process.28 The doctrinal underpinnings of the Court’s criminal 
jurisprudence in the early-to-mid-twentieth century emphasized the 
exceptionalism of American due process. It highlighted the contrast 
between a truly democratic society and the totalitarian regimes of Europe, 
and between free-willed individuals and the coercive state.29 The Court 
contrasted unconstrained foreign police forces that were authorized to 
“wring . . . confessions by physical and mental torture”30 with America’s 
criminal justice system, which was based on “abstract, defendant-oriented 
principles such as liberty, dignity, privacy, rationality, and freedom.”31 
 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
28 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 108 (2010); Bram v. United States, 168 
U.S. 532, 548 (1897); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1884). See also Charles J. 
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1831 (1987); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking 
Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816–17 (2005). 
29 See David T. Hartmann, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda and the War on 
Terror: Desperate Times Do Not Always Call for Desperate Measures, 22. GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 219, 224–25 (2012); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal 
Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 636 (2010). 
30 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944). 
31 Stephanos Bibas, The Rehnquist Court’s Fifth Amendment Incrementalism, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1078, 1081 (2006). See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 
(1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We in this country . . . early made the choice—that the 
dignity and privacy of the individual were worth more to society than an all-powerful 
police.”); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (“A democratic society, in 
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Police were required to use “fair procedures” in interrogating criminal 
suspects for such confessions to be admissible in a court of law.32 Courts 
considered the totality of the circumstances under which a confession was 
extracted on a case-by-case basis.33 But this approach to voluntariness 
proved a poor measure for rooting out unconstitutional conduct. By 
proceeding on a case-by-case basis and by seeing only the most egregious 
cases, the Court was unable to provide law enforcement with clear guidance 
about what interrogation tactics were impermissible.34 These decisions 
provided unsatisfactory guidance for lower courts about what the focus of a 
“totality of the circumstances” analysis should be—the police tactics or the 
characteristics of the suspect.35 
Miranda is a landmark decision, not only for replacing courts’ due 
process balancing test with a bright-line rule establishing protections for 
suspects during custodial police interrogations, but also as an emblem of the 
Warren Court’s expansive social and political vision. From 1953 to 1969, 
when Earl Warren served as its Chief Justice, the Supreme Court took on 
the role of the nation’s moral compass,36 seeking an emphasis on justice 
rather than brute punishment.37 The Court’s decisions from this era—
whatever their context—share a common theme: the federal courts as 
enforcers of individual rights and “equality norms” against the states.38 
Even before Miranda, the Warren Court was particularly concerned 
with the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Frankfurter called the 
privilege against self-incrimination “an important advance in the 
development of our liberty” and “one of the great landmarks in man’s 
 
which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the 
law enforcement process.”). 
32 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 347. 
33 Id. 
34 See Ogletree, supra note 28, at 1832–34. 
35 See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed 
It, How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 163–69 (2007); 
see also Ogletree, supra note 28, at 1834–35. 
36 See Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The 
Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 834 (2012); 
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
845, 847 (2007). 
37 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (requiring states to 
provide legal counsel for felony defendants); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963) 
(allowing federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments); Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that racial segregation of schools violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
38 Resnik, supra note 36, at 834. 
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struggle to make himself civilized.”39 And two years before the Court 
decided Miranda, Justice Goldberg’s opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commissioner of New York Harbor gave an elegant discourse on the right: 
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our 
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an 
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will 
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates “a 
fair state–individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone 
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its 
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load”; our respect for the 
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual “to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private life,” our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; 
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is 
often “a protection to the innocent.”40 
It should not be surprising, then, that Chief Justice Warren’s expansive 
reasoning in Miranda was grounded in preserving “human dignity” and 
“individual liberty” against unjust police interrogation practices.41 With 
these ideas engrained in the Warren Court’s jurisprudence, the stage was set 
for the 1966 decision in Miranda. 
B. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
Of all the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure decisions of the 
twentieth century, Miranda v. Arizona42 is arguably the most well-known. 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion from June 1966 disposed of four 
consolidated cases dealing with related issues of interrogations and 
 
39 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (citing ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 
5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
40 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted), overruled in part by United States v. 
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (rejecting the generalized policy concerns underlying Murphy’s 
holding; see also Bibas, supra note 31, at 1079–80 (discussing the Warren Court’s departure 
from traditional Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence). 
41 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 457 (1966); see also id. at 455–58 (discussing 
contemporary police interrogation techniques); id. at 463–66 (drawing together themes from 
self-incrimination precedents); id. at 468–69 (“The Fifth Amendment privilege is so 
fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate 
warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in 
individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being 
given. . . . More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at 
the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the 
individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.”). 
42 Id. at 436. 
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confessions.43 All four of the cases before the Court that day, including 
namesake Ernesto Miranda’s, “share[d] salient features—incommunicado 
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in 
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional 
rights.”44 While the tactics used by law enforcement in each interrogation 
might have passed muster under a traditional voluntariness analysis,45 the 
Court required more, ultimately imposing on police an affirmative 
obligation to adhere to certain “procedural safeguards” to ensure 
individuals know their rights in order to ameliorate otherwise coercive 
situations.46 
The Court ultimately held that prior to questioning an individual in 
custody, law enforcement agents must “[warn an individual] that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.”47 The Court reasoned that police–citizen 
interactions are inherently coercive, especially those conducted while the 
citizen is in custody.48 Chief Justice Warren noted that, in order to protect 
against such an environment, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination was not limited merely to the criminal courtroom; rather, the 
protection extended to any situation in which a person’s “freedom of action 
is curtailed in any significant way.”49 The Warren Court sought to 
counterbalance the power of the state by strengthening the rights of the 
individual. Rather than focus on reliability of a particular confession, as the 
earlier voluntariness due process inquiry did, Miranda sought to protect the 
individual liberty of all suspects in all inherently coercive environments.50 
C. LIMITING MIRANDA 
Although the Miranda decision seemed to give individuals more 
protections during police interrogations, the Court has since limited the 
Miranda doctrine and its liberal underpinnings. The decision’s expansive 
view of an individual’s confession rights would not last much longer than 
the Warren Court itself. Subsequent decisions in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
 
43 Id. at 440. 
44 Id. at 445. 
45 Id. at 457. 
46 Id. at 444–45. 
47 Id. at 444. 
48 Id. at 445–48. 
49 Id. at 467. 
50 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2010). 
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1990s curtailed the Warren Court’s broad liberal vision in a “series of nieks 
[sic] and cuts that, while not yet fatal, have led to critical blood loss.”51 
In the Fourth Amendment context, evidence discovered through an 
unconstitutional search or seizure must be excluded at trial.52 The 
exclusionary rule is intended to deter government misconduct, incentivize 
compliance with the strictures of the Constitution, and safeguard judicial 
integrity.53 And yet the Rehnquist Court limited the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule to Miranda violations, undercutting the value of this 
constitutional right. For example, the Court held in Harris v. New York that 
unwarned statements in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach the 
defendant’s direct testimony at trial.54 Further, in United States v. Patane, 
the Court declined to extend the full exclusionary rule of the Fourth 
Amendment to Miranda violations and held that the physical fruits of an 
un-Mirandized defendant’s statements could still be admitted at trial.55 
Moreover, the Court set a low bar by which to judge the adequacy of police 
warnings by declining to require officers to recite Miranda’s warnings in 
their entirety;56 made it easy for suspects in custody to waive their rights 
under Miranda;57 and curtailed the duration and circumstances under which 
officers must respect an invocation of rights under Miranda.58 
Unique among Miranda’s progeny is one wholesale exception to the 
Warren Court’s protections: New York v. Quarles, a 1984 decision written 
by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist.59 Benjamin Quarles was charged with 
possession of a weapon in the New York state courts.60 Late one night, a 
 
51 Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1337 (2003); see also 
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain 
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2626 (1996). 
52 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961). 
53 Id. at 656, 659. 
54 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). 
55 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004). 
56 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989); id. at 203 (“[N]o talismanic 
incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda]’s strictures.” (quoting California v. Prysock, 
453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)). 
57 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994) (holding that people 
must unambiguously assert their Miranda rights); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 
373 (1979) (holding that a waiver of Miranda rights need not be explicit). 
58 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2010) (holding that an invocation 
of the right to counsel ends after a fourteen-day break in custody); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 102–03 (1975) (holding that the invocation of the right to remain silent is not 
indefinite). 
59 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
60 Id. at 651. 
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rape victim approached two police officers in Queens, New York, claiming 
that the man who had assaulted her had gone, armed, into a nearby 
supermarket.61 The officers entered the supermarket and quickly found the 
man, Quarles, at the checkout counter and apprehended him.62 One of the 
officers handcuffed and frisked him, finding an empty gun holster on his 
shoulder.63 Before Mirandizing Quarles, the officer asked him where the 
gun was; Quarles gestured and said, “[T]he gun is over there.”64 Only after 
the officer retrieved the gun did he read Quarles his Miranda rights, at 
which point Quarles waived his right to remain silent and his right to an 
attorney and consented to answer more questions.65 The trial court excluded 
Quarles’s initial statement and the gun itself on the grounds that the officer 
had questioned Quarles before reading him his rights, in violation of 
Miranda.66 The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals both affirmed.67 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and carved out a “public 
safety” exception to Miranda, holding that unwarned testimony from a 
suspect in custody could be admitted into evidence in “situation[s] in which 
police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the 
public safety.”68 This exception applies regardless of the actual motivation 
of the officers on the scene.69 Justice Rehnquist concluded that a threat to 
public safety changes the balance between the social cost of respect for 
individual dignity against the need for interrogation and conviction of guilty 
suspects.70 
Miranda warnings may deter suspects from answering questions,71 
and, to Justice Rehnquist, this risk was unacceptable in cases where law 
enforcement officers need to ask questions to get information to protect the 
 
61 Id. at 651–52. 




66 Id. at 652–53. 
67 Id. at 653. 
68 Id. at 656 (emphasis added). 
69 Id. (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where 
spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day, the 
application of the exception which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post 
hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting 
officer.”). 
70 Id. at 657. 
71 The Miranda majority conceded this risk. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479–
81 (1966). Criminological research over the last fifty years is inconclusive. See infra text 
accompanying notes 151–155. 
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public.72 A defendant’s refusal to answer questions in these circumstances 
would not just mean the loss of evidence, Rehnquist reasoned; an officer 
needs these questions answered to defuse any public safety risk.73 Justice 
Rehnquist was clear that courts should defer to an officer’s intuition that a 
certain situation presented a threat to public safety.74 Moreover, according 
to the Justice, there is little risk that officers would take this exception too 
far because “police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively 
between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the 
public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a 
suspect.”75 
Therefore, Quarles established that the public safety exception seems 
to apply to anything a defendant said before being given Miranda warnings, 
whether or not those admissions were related to the public safety issue.76 In 
fact, the exception would apply whether or not there actually turned out to 
be a true threat to public safety, so long as the reviewing court believed the 
officer was trying to protect the public.77 However, the Quarles majority 
was careful to distinguish acceptable prewarning questioning that was 
related to a specific public safety threat from unacceptable prewarning 
questions that were “clearly investigatory.”78 Thus, the public safety 
exception applies when the police officer reasonably believes there is 
danger to public safety, and any answers to questions related to that 
reasonable fear asked before the Miranda warnings are given do not violate 
Miranda and may be admitted at trial. 
Justice Marshall dissented vigorously from any sanctioned exception 
to Miranda: 
The majority has lost sight of the fact that Miranda v. Arizona and our earlier 
custodial-interrogation cases all implemented a constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. The rules established in these cases were designed to protect criminal 
defendants against prosecutions based on coerced self-incriminating statements. The 
 
72 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 658–59. 
76 Id. at 657–58. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 659 n.8 (distinguishing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)). In Orozco, the 
Court upheld suppression of un-Mirandized questioning about the location of a weapon. Id. 
Justice Rehnquist noted in Quarles that the questions in Orozco “did not in any way relate to 
an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger 
associated with the weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by 
the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.” Id. 
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majority today turns its back on these constitutional considerations, and invites the 
government to prosecute through the use of what necessarily are coerced statements.79 
He believed that law enforcement could effectively do its job protecting the 
public safety without an express exception that he believed eviscerated the 
rights secured by Miranda: law enforcement officials can always ask 
suspects whatever questions they deem necessary, but, according to Justice 
Marshall, prosecutors should not be able to admit the resulting testimony at 
trial.80 Justice Marshall argued that already-existing exceptions that 
permitted courts to admit the fruits of unwarned testimony for various 
purposes81 would still allow prosecutors to achieve convictions without 
excising a whole class of cases from Miranda’s purview and devastating 
the underlying Miranda rationale.82 
In each of these cases undercutting Miranda, the Court justified its 
holding by noting that Miranda did not announce a constitutional rule of its 
own, but merely provided a prophylaxis to protect against violations of the 
Fifth Amendment.83 “[A] prophylactic rule is a judicial work product 
somehow distinguishable from judicial interpretation of the Constitution” 
that “overenforces what the Constitution, as judicially interpreted, would 
itself require.”84 Prophylactic rules, because they are not themselves part of 
the Constitution, can be changed by statute or ordinary judicial decision;85 
the Constitution’s provisions can only be amended by the procedures 
established in Article V.86 It was not until 2000, in Dickerson v. United 
States,87 that the Court finally affirmatively addressed Miranda’s status, 
holding in a flawed88 opinion that Miranda is a constitutional right that 
 
79 Id. at 680–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 686. 
81  See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting the use of unwarned 
testimony for impeachment purposes at trial) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 
(imperfect Miranda warnings will not bar the use of a suspect’s testimony at trial where 
statement was otherwise voluntary). 
82 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The irony of the majority’s 
decision is that the public’s safety can be perfectly well protected without abridging the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
83 See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 (“[T]hese procedural safeguards were not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”). 
84 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2004). 
85 Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic Rules,” 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1 (2001). 
86 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
87 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
88 See Caminker, supra note 85, at 5 (noting that the Dickerson decision exhibits a “lack 
of intellectual coherence”); Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s 
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cannot be abrogated by Congress89 while punting on addressing the 
inconsistencies between Miranda and cases like Quarles.90 
But the important takeaway from Dickerson is that Miranda is a 
constitutional rule—the “law as written” for the purposes of our 
constitutional democracy.91 The rule of law fails and threatens the legality 
of a state when there is a “gap” between the law as written and the law as 
applied.92 “Stealth overruling”—whereby the Court claims to be following 
precedent while in reality subtly chipping it away—exempts the Court from 
its proper role in our tripartite democracy and threatens the legitimacy of 
antimajoritarian judicial review.93 A principled approach to the 
Constitution, seeking to give meaning to all of its guarantees, would 
preserve Miranda’s protections and minimize the exceptions to their 
application.  
D. LOWER COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION 
Lower courts disagree markedly over the scope of the public safety 
exception. How important to the Quarles majority was it that the officer 
asked “only the question necessary”94 to defuse the public safety risk before 
informing Quarles of his rights? The Court gave no guidance as to how to 
determine which questions are “necessary” to protect the public and which 
might be merely helpful in a future prosecution. Similarly, it is unclear how 
significant Justice Rehnquist’s inclusion of the phrase “on these facts” is to 
the holding—a situation in which the officers on the scene specifically 
knew the risk to public safety.95 Absent any further direction from the 
 
Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 902 (2001) (arguing that “Dickerson could 
have been written coherently—that the Court could have crafted other resolutions that would 
have allowed it to harmonize its doctrine far more effectively than the skimpy, jerry-built 
opinion the Court announced”); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
975, 976 (2001) (referring to Dickerson as an “opportunity missed” to make Miranda 
jurisprudence coherent and effect real change). 
89 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. 
90 Id. at 441. 
91 See Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police Executives Toward 
Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 929 (2007). 
92 Id. 
93 See Friedman, supra note 50, at 3–4; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare 
Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2008) 
(commenting on courts “purport[ing] to respect a precedent while in fact cynically 
interpreting it into oblivion”). 
94 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984). 
95 Id. at 655. As Justice Marshall’s dissent shrewdly points out, the facts as recounted by 
Justice Rehnquist differ markedly from those found by New York’s highest court. Id. at 
675–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to that record, Quarles had been “reduced to a 
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Supreme Court, circuit courts have been divided over what factual 
circumstances are required to properly invoke Quarles.96 
The First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits take a broad approach to the 
public safety exception, admitting prewarning statements in inherently 
dangerous situations, regardless of the immediacy or severity of the threat 
to public safety.97 These circuits do not require that officers have actual 
knowledge of weapons or other threats, only that the questions they ask of 
the suspect be “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”98  
Threats to public safety may include threats only to police officers who are 
acting in the course of their job.99 These courts may admit evidence 
resulting from prewarning questioning whenever there is an “objectively 
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate 
danger,”100 such as asking an arrestee whether he had drugs or needles on 
his person that might hurt an officer during a bodily search,101 asking a 
drunk man if he had a gun on his person in an area filled with bars and 
 
condition of physical powerlessness” by the time police officers questioned him about his 
gun. Id. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the opinion below in the Court of Appeals 
of New York, 444 N.E.2d 984 (N.Y. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the 
purposes of this Comment, I will accept the majority’s account of the facts, which does not 
affect my arguments below. 
96 See Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Strange Bedfellows: How Expanding the Public 
Safety Exception to Miranda Benefits Counterterrorism Suspects, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 
10 (2013); Keith A. Petty, A Different Kind of Criminal? Miranda, Terror Suspects, and the 
Public Safety Exception, 4 ELON L. REV. 175, 181–82 (2012); Rorie A. Norton, Comment, 
Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel over the Scope of the Quarles Exception to 
Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1947–60 (2010). 
97 Norton, supra note 96, at 1948. See, e.g., United States v. Watters, 572 F.3d 479, 482–
83 (8th Cir. 2009) (permitting questioning of a suspect to locate a gun he “might have 
hidden” on a street busy with bars); United States v. Fox, 393 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(allowing an officer to question a suspect because of a visible “bulge” in his pocket), 
vacated, 545 U.S. 1125 (2005) (remanding for further consideration in light of the Court’s 
opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)); United States v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 
986, 992 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he exception was properly applied because there existed an 
objectively reasonable need for the officer to protect himself from potential bodily harm.”). 
98 United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. 
Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord 
Watters, 572 F.3d at 483; Fox, 393 F.3d at 60; Reilly, 224 F.3d at 992. 
99 See, e.g., United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 2008) (allowing 
officers to question a suspect before Mirandizing him even though they had already 
handcuffed the suspect and seized his gun because they “had good reason to be concerned 
that additional weapons might pose a threat to their safety”). 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Carillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United 
States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 888 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
101 Id. 
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people,102 or asking a suspect if he was armed in a case where officers had 
not yet secured the surrounding area.103 
On the other hand, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
take a narrow approach,104 admitting prewarning admissions and evidence 
only when law enforcement officers have actual knowledge of an imminent 
threat to public safety. This 
exception applies only where there is “an objectively reasonable need to protect the 
police or the public from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.” Absent 
such circumstances posing an objective danger to the public or police, the need for the 
exception is not apparent, and the suspicion that the questioner is on a fishing 
expedition outweighs the belief that public safety motivated the questioning that all 
understand is otherwise improper.105 
These courts have upheld admissions when the suspects were asked 
about guns when they were arrested during a drug deal106 and when officers 
saw a magazine of semiautomatic weapons and ammunition when they 
entered a suspect’s home to arrest him,107 but not when the suspect was 
already in custody and his gun was hidden in a place to which the public 
had access.108 The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Raborn drew a 
distinction between a case like Quarles, in which the gun was likely on the 
defendant’s person and in his control, and a case like the one before them, 
in which the gun was easily accessible to and within the control of the 
police.109 
 
102 Watters, 572 F.3d at 482–83. 
103 Reilly, 224 F.3d at 992. 
104 Norton, supra note 96, at 1948. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 153–
54 (2d Cir. 2003) (allowing questioning of a suspect who was known to carry a gun when he 
was arrested in the afternoon near a school); United States v. Lackey, 334 F.3d 1224, 1227 
(10th Cir. 2003) (permitting officers to ask a “focused question” that implicated the safety of 
the officer and bystanders); United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(permitting an officer to ask a suspect about the presence of a gun after the officer had seen 
ammunition and a magazine in plain sight); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (“Mobley was encountered naked; by the time he was arrested, the FBI already 
had made a security sweep of his premises, and they had found that he was the sole 
individual present, and that the apartment was a residence for Mobley alone”); United States 
v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the public safety exception does 
not apply to a suspect’s truck, where only officers had access). 
105 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984)) 
(emphasis added). 
106 Reyes, 353 F.3d at 153–54. 
107 Talley, 275 F.3d at 564. 
108 Raborn, 872 F.2d at 595. 
109 Id. 
3. LONKY (JWM Final) 7/3/2017  9:02 AM 
408  LONKY [Vol. 107 
In one of the more pertinent cases—Justice Marshall’s proverbial 
“ticking time bomb” scenario110—the Second Circuit held in United States 
v. Khalil that a defendant’s prewarning statements were correctly admitted 
under the public safety exception.111 In that case, upon information that an 
informant’s two roommates had built bombs and intended to detonate them 
in the New York City subway, police raided a Brooklyn apartment. They 
found two men and a black bag, which turned out to contain pipe bombs 
with their switches flipped.112 A gunfight ensued, putting both men in the 
hospital.113 Police questioned one of the defendants, Gazi Ibrahim Abu 
Mezer, in the hospital almost immediately, out of concern that the bomb 
would detonate before they could disarm it. In doing so, the officers asked 
questions only directly related to the weapons: the number of bombs, how 
to disarm them, and whether they were attached to timers.114 Abu Mezer 
answered all of these questions.115 Officers also asked Abu Mezer whether 
he had planned to kill himself, to which he answered, “Poof.”116 The 
District Court admitted these hospital statements in their entirety, rejecting 
Abu Mezer’s argument that “Poof” was unrelated to the public safety.117 
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that even if “Poof” did not fit within 
the public safety exception, its admission was merely harmless error.118 
This case fits within the Second Circuit’s narrow approach to Quarles 
because the questioning officers asked questions related only to their actual 
knowledge of the bombs. 
The difference between the broad and narrow interpretations of the 
Quarles public safety exception, while admittedly sometimes negligible, 
has the potential to overwhelm Miranda itself and render the rule 
 
110 In his Quarles dissent, Justice Marshall argued that a public safety exception was 
unnecessary because police are always free to disregard Miranda if they think it necessary—
prosecutors would just be unable to admit the defendant’s unwarned testimony at trial. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall gave the example of “a 
bomb . . . about to explode” as the quintessential situation in which the public is seriously 
imperiled enough to justify ignoring constitutional rights (thereby implying that a gun may 
or may not be sufficient). Id. Yet, Justice Marshall still believed that the state should pay the 
consequences of inadmissibility if officers asked defendants questions in custody without 
delivering Miranda warnings. Id. 
111 United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2000). 





117 Id. at 116, 121. 
118 Id. at 122. 
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meaningless. The difference between the broad and narrow approaches may 
mean the difference between admission (using the former approach) and 
suppression (using the latter) of testimony in cases like that of Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev. As one commentator has noted, “[I]n its most permissive posture, 
the [public safety exception] will admit testimony in response to any 
question that could have been intended to secure public safety—even if the 
question was asked with the motive to incriminate or if there was never any 
actual public safety threat.”119 Absent better guidance as to when and how 
the public safety exception may be properly invoked, the exception 
threatens to consume the rule and render Miranda virtually meaningless. 
II. THE WAR ON TERROR 
The scope of the public safety exception to Miranda has great 
significance in the prosecution of domestic terrorism in the U.S. civilian 
criminal justice system. The Obama Administration’s policy of prosecuting 
domestic terrorists in civilian courts,120 rather than as enemy combatants 
before military tribunals like the Bush White House did,121 means the space 
between the broad and narrow approaches to Quarles is a distinction with a 
real difference. Now that we speak of terrorism in the language of “crime” 
and not “war,” it should be treated, academically and procedurally, in the 
same way as other crimes.122 The public safety exception to Miranda can, 
and should, apply to suspected terrorists just as it does to any other 
suspected criminal.123 Because terrorists are now tried in civilian courts, 
their fates will often turn on what information will be excluded or admitted 
at trial, which in turn depends on the breadth of the public safety exception. 
Procedural protections like Miranda are particularly important when the 
death penalty is on the line—which 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a), use of weapons of 
mass destruction, carries. It is critical to ensure the legitimacy of our 
constitutional democracy in the ideologically-freighted environment of 
terrorism in the United States.124 
 
119 Joanna Wright, Comment, Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1308 (2011). 
120 Petty, supra note 96, at 184 & nn.62–63. 
121 See M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture, the Right to Counsel and 
the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 631, 631 (2007). 
122 See Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and Counterterrorism, 
71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2011); see Hartmann, supra note 29, at 235–41. 
123 A discussion of Miranda’s application in other executive branch–run coercive 
environments—for example, Guantanamo and other black box sites—is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
124 See Margulies, supra note 26, at 731. 
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A. THE OCTOBER 2010 FBI MEMO 
Unless and until the Supreme Court clarifies the proper boundaries of 
the public safety exception, law enforcement officials at the state and 
federal levels have almost free reign to question whomever, whenever and 
however they see fit, so long as there is at least some minimal post-hoc 
public safety justification. The lack of clarity in this area threatens our 
rights and the legitimacy of our constitutional democracy. 
A perfect example of the dangers of this uncertainty is manifest in an 
unsigned memorandum from the FBI and the Department of Justice, dated 
October 21, 2010, and published by the New York Times in March 2011.125 
Citing Quarles, the memo instructs agents to question un-Mirandized 
suspects about anything “reasonably prompted by an immediate concern for 
the safety of the public or the arresting agents.”126 The memo further 
advises that officers may ask questions beyond the immediate threat if 
“valuable and timely intelligence” may be recovered from the suspect.127 
The memo rationalizes that the intelligence and security issues specific 
to terrorism justify these extraordinary measures.128 Agents are instructed to 
seek approval for extra-Miranda questioning from FBI headquarters, the 
Department of Justice, or the Office of General Counsel when there is 
time.129 The memo, however, leaves final discretion with the agents on the 
scene, who can assess “all the facts and circumstances” and make a 
determination regarding when to Mirandize an arrestee “on a case-by-case 
basis.”130 The memo suggests areas of unwarned questioning that should be 
broached prior to warning: “questions about possible impending or 
coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature, and threat posed by 
weapons that might post an imminent danger to the public; and the 
identities, locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may be 
plotting additional imminent attacks.”131 
 
125 Internal Memorandum from Fed. Bureau of Investigation on Custodial Interrogation 
for Public Safety and Intelligence-Gathering Purposes of Operational Terrorists Inside the 
United States (October 21, 2010) [hereinafter Internal FBI Memorandum], available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html?_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NLW2-9ZKL; see Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for 
Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A17. 
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In practical terms, this memo authorizes FBI agents to ask almost 
anyone suspected of terrorism any question. This approach is problematic: 
“Using the doctrine to justify questioning suspects in non-emergency 
situations amounts to a deliberate end-run around the Miranda rule.”132 
Dickerson made clear that legislative attempts to evade Miranda are 
unconstitutional; it is unclear why an executive evasion would be any less 
problematic. Although the memo lacks the precedential value of statutory 
or common law, it reveals the executive branch’s views on Miranda and, 
until challenged in the courts, it reveals the way law enforcement officers 
are likely to be trained to approach interrogating suspects. 
The memo was likely an internal response to two unrelated domestic 
terrorism incidents: the failed bombing of an international Northwest 
Airlines flight on Christmas Day 2009,133 and the attempted car bombing of 
Times Square on May 1, 2010.134 In the first, a young Nigerian man, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, was taken into FBI custody immediately upon 
landing in Michigan after the bomb he was wearing on board failed to 
detonate and instead started a small fire in the cabin.135 Recent interviews 
with the local FBI agents who questioned him before he was Mirandized, 
nine hours after being taken into custody, reveal the wealth of confessions 
he made—the type of bomb, that he was affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and that 
he was acting alone.136 After less than an hour of questioning, officers 
realized Abdulmutallab was under the influence of some type of medication 
 
132 Joe Palazzolo & Tammy Audi, ‘Public Safety’ Exception to Miranda Warnings Arises 
in LAX-Shooting Case, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Nov. 7, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2013/11/07/public-safety-exception-to-miranda-warnings-arises-in-lax-shooting-
case (quoting defense lawyer Justine Harris) (internal quotation marks omitted), archived at 
http://perma.cc/632L-MA3Y. 
133 See Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Plane Passenger Tried to Detonate 
Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1. 
134 See Mark Mazzetti et al., Terrorism Suspect, Charged, Admits to Role in Bomb Plot, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A1. 
135 O’Connor & Schmitt, supra note 133 (misstating the given name of the bombing 
suspect as “Abdul Farouk Abdulmutallab”); see Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror 
Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES (updated Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html (correcting the error), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YV5S-FDJ7. 
136 See Scott Lewis, Exclusive: FBI Agents Reveal Underwear Bomber Abdulmutallab 
Wore Explosive Underwear for Three Weeks, ABC 7 WXYZ DETROIT (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:03 
PM), http://www.wxyz.com/dpp/news/local_news/investigations/fbi-agents-underwear-
bomber-abdulmutallab-wore-underwear-for-3-weeks, archived at http://perma.cc/7WJZ-
7DPH; Walter Pincus, Bomb Suspect Was Read Miranda Rights Nine Hours After Arrest, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A6. 
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and broke to allow the medication to wear off.137 Once the interrogation 
resumed, Abdulmutallab became far less talkative, at which point he was 
read his Miranda rights.138 In the end, Abdulmutallab pled guilty to the 
eight federal terrorism-related charges brought against him, so we will 
never know whether the Michigan federal judge would have admitted his 
unwarned admissions.139 
Republican legislators were outraged that the Obama Administration 
chose to try Abdulmutallab in a civilian court and that President Obama 
directed FBI officers at the scene to read him his Miranda rights so soon.140 
Before the furor could die away, news broke of a second foiled domestic 
terrorist plot just months later. On May 1, 2010, a car bomb was discovered 
in a parked SUV in Times Square in Manhattan.141 Law enforcement 
identified Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen from Pakistan.142 
He was arrested at John F. Kennedy Airport trying to flee to Dubai.143 FBI 
agents questioned him for three or four hours before Mirandizing him; he 
waived his rights and continued cooperating, admitting that he had been 
trained in explosives in Pakistan and was working alone.144 Shahzad, too, 
eventually pled guilty to his charges.145 
A week after the Shahzad incident, Attorney General Eric Holder went 
on the record on Meet the Press to say that the Obama Administration 
would “seek a law allowing investigators to interrogate terrorism suspects 
 
137 Opinion, Abdulmutallab in 50 Minutes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2010, at A16. 
138 Id. It is worth noting that it appears there is some confusion over the exact timeline; 
some reports suggest that Abdulmutallab may have stopped cooperating before he was read 
his Miranda rights. See, e.g., Pincus, supra note 136. 
139 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Sentenced to Life 
in Prison for Attempted Bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 (Feb. 16, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-sentenced-life-
prison-attempted-bombing-flight-253-christmas-day, archived at https://perma.cc/5TZW-
8MWM?type=source. 
140 See Pincus, supra note 136; Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Details of 
Terror Arrest Emerge, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A1. 
141 Al Baker & Karin Henry, Car Bomb Leads to Evacuation in Times Square, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 2, 2010, at A1. 
142 Mazzetti et al., supra note 134. 
143 Id. 
144 Id.; see Michael B. Mukasey, Opinion, Shahzad and the Pre-9/11 Paradigm, WALL 
ST. J., May 12, 2010, at A19; Charlie Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A1. 
145 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan 
Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square 
(June 21, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-721.html, 
archived at https://perma.cc/SX9D-YRKB?type=source. 
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without informing them of their rights.”146 A handful of Miranda-related 
bills were proposed in the 111th Congress, including measures to prohibit 
using authorized funds to provide Miranda warnings to foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorist activity147 and a proposal that would prohibit the use 
of Miranda and related warnings in new “procedures relating to high-value 
detainees.”148 Neither of these proposals gained serious traction, nor is it 
likely that one will, given the general consensus that the public safety 
exception is flexible enough to effectively aid law enforcement in most 
situations.149 But the FBI memo shows that the executive branch has taken 
it upon itself to push the boundaries of the public safety exception,150 
further widening the gap between the law as written (Miranda) and the law 
as applied, and threatening the rule of law at home. 
B. MIRANDA, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
Critics argue that because Miranda has the potential to deter criminal 
defendants’ confessions, it is especially inappropriate in the sensitive 
national security context of the War on Terror. Scholars disagree, however, 
about the extent to which Miranda has a negative “social cost” on the 
criminal justice system generally and law enforcement practice in 
particular.151 The general consensus is “that Miranda has had relatively 
little effect on law enforcement.”152 Some studies indicate that “even when 
Miranda warnings are properly administered many suspects still choose to 
waive their rights,”153 but other studies point in the other direction. One 
quantitative study examined the number of confessions and convictions lost 
because suspects refused to cooperate once they were Mirandized. This 
study concluded that “Miranda has led to lost cases against almost four 
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percent of all criminal suspects in this country who are questioned.”154 
While this statistic sounds small, in the aggregate this could mean an 
unacceptably high number of criminals have been set free.155 
Whatever Miranda’s social cost in the ordinary criminal context, it is 
obvious that there may be a special cost to using Miranda in terrorist 
interrogations: a criminal conviction is not the government’s only interest in 
these situations. In any terrorist interrogation, there is always a tension 
between two national security interests: “(1) neutralizing the current 
terrorist threat and (2) gathering intelligence in order to neutralize future 
terrorist threats.”156 In fact, some commentators, politicians, and 
practitioners argue that because of the “heightened level of criminality”157 
of terrorists, Miranda should be abandoned altogether.158  
It is true that “[d]elaying Miranda warnings in order to gain 
information that could prevent a terror attack is a considerable public 
interest.”159 But that does not mean that Miranda needs to be changed for 
the War on Terror. Coupling Miranda with the public safety exception, one 
study concluded Miranda poses no special issues for interrogating 
suspected terrorists, arguing that “the [public safety exception] deftly 
balances Miranda’s constitutional safeguards with public safety, 
extinguishing any need for legislation revoking suspected terrorists’ 
Miranda warnings, a constitutional right crucial to ensuring procedural due 
process.”160 In fact, David Kris, a former Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security at the Department of Justice, notes that intelligence 
gathered from Mirandized testimony is only slightly less effective than 
unwarned testimony.161 Quarles alone can account for the special interests 
of a terrorist interrogation as both an intelligence-gathering tool and a 
source of evidence in a criminal prosecution. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
declared that the public safety exception “will be circumscribed by the 
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exigency which justifies it.”162 If a terror suspect really poses a higher risk 
than a run-of-the-mill criminal does, then our interrogation-confession 
doctrine, as narrowly construed by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Tenth Circuits, can accommodate that. 
The debate over Miranda and the War on Terror has only intensified in 
the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing. Popular media has been 
filled with commentary about Miranda, the public safety exception, its 
origins, and its scope.163 Some legal scholars have called for a robust public 
safety exception whenever there might be a “ticking-bomb scenario.”164 
Others have argued that “[w]hen the law gets bent out of shape for 
[Tsarnaev], it’s easier to bend out of shape for the rest of us,”165 and that 
“[i]t appears to be DOJ policy to consider invoking the public-safety 
exception whenever possible to gather information or intelligence.”166 
There is a plethora of informed, persuasive, and even contradictory, 
opinions out there. Much of the confusion surrounding acts of terror and 
Miranda rights comes down to which circumstances justify an invocation of 
Quarles.167 
In many ways, we are back in the world in which Miranda and its 
predecessors were decided: one pitting the discourses of democracy, 
individualism, and liberty against totalitarianism and extremism. The 
individual rights values underlying the Warren Court’s decisions are 
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relevant again today and should not be ignored. One commentator has 
argued that “exploiting constitutional exceptions vis-à-vis terror suspects 
signals to terrorists that their actions are successful at forcing us to dilute 
civil liberties.”168 Others have questioned the legitimacy of a government 
that acts against the “fundamental rights of the people as well as the rule of 
law.”169 Expanding the public safety exception beyond the bounds 
suggested by Quarles and into the broad approach—or worse, allowing the 
executive to unilaterally announce constitutional policy in the form of an 
FBI memorandum—is exactly that kind of illegitimate action. 
The unfortunate truth is that domestic terrorism shows no sign of 
disappearing—in fact, people like Abdulmutallab, Shahzad, Tsarnaev, 
James Holmes of Aurora, Colorado,170 and Paul Ciancia (at Los Angeles 
International Airport171) will continue to attempt terrorist acts around the 
country.172 The extent of the public safety exception to the requirement that 
individuals be provided with certain inalienable rights is a serious dilemma. 
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, the most 
principled way to deal with this exception is to contain it as narrowly as 
possible and protect the rule of law by complying with the letter of Miranda 
as far as possible. By requiring officers to have reasonable knowledge of an 
immediate threat to the public, the narrow approach hews closely to the 
facts and reasoning of Quarles itself,173 and it allows both Miranda and 
Quarles to coexist without one overwhelming the other. 
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III. DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV AND THE 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
Some commentators argue that the public safety exception, used 
expansively with regard to terrorists, presents no constitutional problems 
because it does nothing not already sanctioned by the Supreme Court.174 
And technically, they might be correct—one could argue that the October 
2010 FBI/DOJ memo is simply an extreme version of the broad approach to 
Quarles followed by the First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. But after the 
Court held in Dickerson that Miranda is a constitutional right that cannot be 
abrogated by the legislature, it makes no sense for the executive branch to 
be allowed to virtually obliterate that same right. The interrogation of 
terrorists fits within the coercive paradigm Miranda sought to remedy,175 
and if Miranda still means anything for civil liberties, it needs to be 
invoked in the situations it was designed to remedy—especially when those 
suspects, like Faisal Shahzad and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, are American 
citizens. 
America can still improve its anti-terrorism security under the 
framework of the narrow public safety exception, which requires officers to 
have actual knowledge of an imminent threat to public safety. Any 
testimony in a true “ticking time bomb” scenario could be admitted, like in 
United States v. Khalil; anything less would be excluded, under the Warren 
Court’s vision of criminal law, as a fishing expedition. Adherence to the 
rule of law requires a circumscribed application of the public safety 
exception such that Miranda is as fully realized in reality as it appears on 
paper. The narrow approach follows the reasoning of Quarles itself, 
allowing both doctrines to coexist without one overwhelming the other. The 
Supreme Court should clarify that the application of the exception is 
extremely narrow in all public safety situations. 
When Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was apprehended on April 19, four days 
after the bombs detonated on Boylston Street, he was practically 
incapacitated and in dire need of medical care to address gunshot 
wounds.176 The next day, on April 20, FBI agents questioned Tsarnaev in 
the hospital, although he was unable to speak due to his injuries and had to 
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respond in writing.177 It was not until Monday, April 22, a week after the 
bombing and after sixteen hours of interrogation, that Magistrate Judge 
Marianne B. Bowler read Tsarnaev his rights during a bedside special court 
appearance.178 
Regardless of the time medical attention would take, the Department 
of Justice was clear immediately after officers arrested Tsarnaev that it 
would be invoking the public safety exception to question him in the 
hospital before reading him his rights.179 Unlike the other suspects 
discussed above, Tsarnaev did not plead guilty to the charges and 
proceeded to trial in March 2015.180 Since Tsarnaev was charged in the 
District of Massachusetts, it is likely that his unwarned testimony would 
have been admitted at trial under Quarles if it had been offered into 
evidence, since the First Circuit follows the broad approach to the public 
safety exception. But if confronted with that evidence, the District Court 
should not have admitted Tsarnaev’s confession. 
Under the narrow approach, Tsarnaev’s medical status should have 
made clear that there was no immediate threat to law enforcement officers 
or the public—he was captured in a dry-docked boat in a Boston backyard 
after suffering significant blood loss and admitted to a local hospital in 
“serious” condition.181 And even if his activities (involving a bomb, a car 
chase, a shootout) of the previous few days prompted a reasonable concern 
for public safety, it should have become clear almost immediately that once 
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Tsarnaev was in police custody, no further threat existed. At most, law 
enforcement needed a few hours to defuse the threat and discover other 
weapons or co-conspirators, not days. Tsarnaev’s case is about as different 
from Quarles as can be—there was no knowledge of weapons on the scene; 
there was no physical struggle; and officers had days, not minutes, to plan 
their questioning.182 
Miranda and its requirements should have applied when officers first 
found and questioned Tsarnaev because he was clearly subject to a 
custodial interrogation. Using the narrow interpretation of the public safety 
exception, Tsarnaev should have been warned of his rights before 
questioning, and since he was not, any statements given before Judge 
Bowles read him his rights should have been excluded at his trial. The 
officers on the scene had no actual knowledge of an imminent threat, and 
any threat of a second bombing incident could arguably have been 
uncovered as easily by officers legally searching the Tsarnaev brothers’ 
apartment and questioning friends, family, and neighbors as by questioning 
an injured suspect, Tsarnaev, who was unable to speak and in intensive 
medical care. In fact, as in most cases, the FBI still had plenty of other 
inculpatory evidence to obtain a conviction without needing to admit an un-
Mirandized confession.183 The court system could have had its cake and 
have eaten it, too, following the narrow approach: it would have been able 
to respect Tsarnaev’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination while 
still obtaining the conviction of a dangerous criminal. In cases where the 
death penalty is on the line,184 the utmost care should be taken to observe 
each and every protection the Constitution affords. 
CONCLUSION 
The Warren Court had lofty visions when it decided Miranda in 1966. 
It sought to uphold the civil liberties of the individual, minimize the 
coercive power of the state, and make the American criminal justice system 
a beacon of liberty and integrity in the Cold War. The Quarles public safety 
exception seriously jeopardizes that vision, and expansions of the exception 
with regards to the War on Terror threaten it even further. Our 
constitutional democracy depends on the rule of law for its legitimacy. 
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Because Miranda is a constitutional right, exceptions to its rule must be 
minimized as much as possible. The only principled way to deal with the 
inconsistencies between Miranda and Quarles is to contain the public 
safety exception as narrowly as possible, following the approach adopted 
by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, until the Supreme 
Court gives further guidance. As the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev shows, the 
narrow approach can simultaneously ensure constitutional rights, protect 
immediate public safety, and permit successful prosecution of criminal 
activity. 
